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An Ill Wind Blows: Restricting the
Public's Right of Access to Search
Warrant Affidavits
INTRODUCTION
"Operation Ill-Wind," a far-ranging federal investigation
into fraud and corruption in the defense contracting industry,
became public for the first time in June, 1988. Early that
month, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ap-
plied to United States district courts in at least sixteen judicial
districts' for a total of more than forty warrants 2 to search the
homes and offices of "Operation Ill-Wind" suspects.3 The FBI
supported its applications with detailed affidavits demonstrat-
ing probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.4
On June 14, 1988, FBI agents around the country simulta-
neously served and executed thirty-nine5 "Ill-Wind" search
warrants, attracting the attention of the public and the media.6
When the media subsequently tried to gain access to the affida-
vits that described the reasons for the searches, 7 however, they
1. Brief of Appellants/Petitioners at 6, Times Mirror Co. v. United
States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-6278).
2. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas
Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 570 (8th Cir. 1988), cert denied,
109 S. Ct. 793 (1989).
3. Many of the search warrants were for offices of some of the nation's
largest defense contractors, including McDonnell Douglas in Missouri;
Teledyne Electronics, Litton Data Systems, and Northrup in California; and
Unisys in Minnesota. Id at 570, 577. Investigators also searched the offices of
several Department of Defense officials. Id at 577 n.1 (Heaney, J., concurring
and dissenting).
4. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1211. The fourth amendment requires affi-
davits, providing:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Brief of Appellants/Petitioners at 6, Times Mirror (No. 88-6278).
6. Gunn, 855 F.2d at 570. The Eighth Circuit attributed the intense me-
dia attention to "[t]he nature and scope of the investigation and the dramatic
manner in which the search warrants were executed." Id
7. The media routinely use search warrant affidavits as a means of fol-
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discovered that the courts had sealed the affidavits at the re-
quest of the Justice Department 8 Several media organizations
filed lawsuits in various jurisdictions seeking access to the
sealed affidavits on first amendment and other grounds. These
suits raised the question of whether the public has a right of ac-
cess to search warrant affidavits while a pre-indictment investi-
gation 9 is in progress.10 The suits pitted the press," which
urged recognition of a first amendment right of access, 12 against
lowing police activity. The Star Tribune, Minnesota's largest circulation daily
newspaper, sends a reporter every day to read the search warrant affidavits
filed at the Hennepin County (Minneapolis) courthouse. Interview with Dan
Oberdorfer, Star Tribune staff reporter, in Minneapolis (Jan. 23, 1990). A
handbook for reporters includes the following paragraph:
A "blotter" should indicate some reference to a formal document
used to support the request for a... search warrant. This document
is an affidavit, a sworn statement by an officer seeking to justify a re-
quest for court permission to make ... a search by showing "probable
cause." A reporter should seek access to the affidavit itself. It could
become crucial in determining whether the warrant was justified -
and, thus, whether police evidence resulting from [a) ... search may
be used to prosecute the accused.
L. DENNISON, THE REPORTER AND THE LAw 86 (1980).
8. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1211; Gunn, 855 F.2d at 571; In re Search
Warrants Issued on June 11, 1988 for the Premises of Three Buildings at
Unisys, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 701, 702 (D.Minn. 1989). The courts sealed the affida-
vits as a result of ex parte motions filed by the government. Id.
9. This Note does not address the right of access to search warrant affi-
davits "after an investigation is concluded or after indictments have been re-
turned." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1211. Presumably, if a right of access to
the affidavits exists while an investigation is underway, that right would only
be stronger once the investigation is completed.
10. Before 1988, the only federal case to consider the question of access to
search warrant affidavits was In re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bed-
room, 489 F. Supp. 207, 208-09 (D.R.I. 1980) (allowing a newspaper access to
search warrant affidavits). Because the government did not appeal the deci-
sion in Second Floor Bedroom, no federal court above the district court level
had addressed the question of access to search warrant affidavits prior to the
"Ill-Wind" cases.
11. Although the media have served as plaintiff in virtually every right of
access case, the right of access belongs to the public rather than to the press
alone. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (Press-
Enterprise II) (stating that "the right asserted here is that of the public under
the first amendment"); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
609 (1978) (noting that "[t]he First Amendment generally grants the press no
right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public"). Indi-
viduals, however, largely rely on the media to exercise the right of access and
to publish any newsworthy information. As Professor Cox has noted, "[o]nly
the organized print and electronic media have the enormous resources re-
quired to seek out, assimilate, and interpret information of governing impor-
tance." Cox, Freedom of the Press, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 3, 4.
12. The Supreme Court has recognized that the first amendment protects
the right of the public and the media to gather information. See Branzburg v.
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the FBI, which was concerned primarily with protecting the in-
tegrity of ongoing investigations.1 3
This Note attempts to balance those positions, in light of
the conflicting results reached by the Fourth, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits. Part I reviews the history of the public right of
access to a variety of judicial proceedings and related docu-
ments. Part II critiques the federal courts' analyses of the right
of access to search warrant affidavits. This Note argues that
there is a qualified first amendment right of access to such doc-
uments. The Note further contends that those courts that have
not found a constitutional right of access to search warrant affi-
davits have misapplied the Supreme Court's inadequately con-
structed test for determining the right of access. In Part III,
the Note proposes a modified test that would allow courts to
balance the public's first amendment right of access to the judi-
cial process with the government's frequent need for secrecy in
ongoing investigations.
I. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Although the Constitution guarantees an accused's right to
a public trial,14 the Supreme Court did not recognize the pub-
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972). Scholars, however, still disagree on
whether the Constitution protects the public's "right to know" information.
See generally O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to
Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 579-86 (1980) (outlining the debate on
the existence of a constitutionally protected right to know). This Note exam-
ines the scope of the right to know in the context of judicial proceedings and
documents, necessarily assuming, as the Court has, that there is some level of
first amendment protection for that right.
13. See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of
Thomas Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 793 (1989) (noting that "[t]he district court decided that
unsealing the affidavits and other materials would prejudice the government's
on-going investigation"). The subjects of the search warrants also have an in-
terest in protecting their privacy. In two "Ill-Wind" cases, the Doe parties,
subjects of the search warrants in question, joined the federal government as
appellees. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1210; Unisys, 710 F. Supp. at 702; see also
Gunn, 855 F.2d at 570 (noting that Thomas Gunn and McDonnell Douglas,
subjects of an "Ill-Wind" search, filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the
government's effort to keep the search warrant affidavits sealed).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all crimi-




lic's constitutional right to attend trials until 1980.15 In Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia,16 Chief Justice Burger, writing
for a three-Justice plurality, traced the history of the open trial
in the Anglo-American judicial system from the time of the
Norman Conquest to the present day.17 The Court found an
"unbroken, uncontradicted history" of common law access to
trials.18 Additionally, Chief Justice Burger argued that public
trials are important to the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system in a democracy.19 The credibility of the criminal
justice system is greatly decreased, he argued, when courts
render decisions behind closed doors.20
In addition to finding a common law right of access to the
courtroom, the Richmond Newspapers plurality recognized a
corresponding constitutional right of access.2 ' Because trials
15. The Court first considered the public's right of access to criminal pro-
ceedings in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The Gannett
Court found no sixth amendment guarantee of access to pre-trial suppression
hearings. Id. at 390-91. The Court, however, expressly declined to consider
whether such a right exists under the first amendment. Id. at 392 & n.24.
16. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). The Richmond Court distin-
guished Gannett in two ways. First, the Court noted that it was considering
the right of access to trials, rather than to hearings on pretrial motions. Id. at
563-64. The Court also noted that it was considering whether the first amend-
ment, *rather than the sixth amendment, protects the right of access to trials.
Id.
17. See id. at 564-73. In England, before the tenth century, freemen were
required to attend all trials in their community, a practice that Chief Justice
Burger likened to modern jury duty. Id. at 565. Although compulsory attend-
ance was eliminated gradually after the Norman Conquest in 1066, criminal
trials remained presumptively open throughout English history. Id. at 565-67.
This history of openness became an integral part of the justice system in the
American colonies. Id at 567.
One drawback of Chief Justice Burger's millennium-long history of the
open trial is that it is an exercise that one could not repeat for any other as-
pect of the modern criminal justice system. Most, if not all, modern judicial
practices, such as the suppression hearing and the search warrant affidavit,
came into existence relatively recently. See Note, What Ever Happened to the
"Right to Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Rich-
mond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1130-34 (1987).
18. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
19. Id. at 569-74. Not only is the open trial a millennium-old tradition, it
is "supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past." Id. at 573.
20. Id. at 571. Chief Justice Burger noted that an unexpected decision in a
closed trial "can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at
worst has been corrupted." Id. He also remarked that when a shocking crime
occurs, seeing justice done at a public trial has "significant community thera-
peutic value" by satisfying the community's urge for retribution. Id. at 570-71.
"[N]o community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a corner [or] in any
covert manner.'" Id at 571 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 580. "[Ihe right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guar-
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historically were open to the public, the Court reasoned that
the Framers intended to protect the right to attend them.22
Prohibitions on access to the courtroom, the Court found,
would infringe on the first amendment freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly.23
Although the Richmond Newspapers plurality stated that
the constitutional right to attend trials is not absolute,2 it did
not delineate the circumstances in which a trial judge might be
able to close all or part of a trial.25 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed this question two years later in Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court,26 adopting a strict scrutiny standard for deter-
mining when a court may exclude the public and press from a
antees of the First Amendment .... ." 1d. (footnote omitted). The Court had
to find a common law right of access as a prerequisite to a first amendment
right. The common law right of access is based solely on historical tradition.
See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) (hold-
ing that a long tradition of public access to judicial documents created a com-
mon law right of access to such documents). In contrast, a first amendment
right is based on historical tradition and other factors. See infra notes 33-38
and accompanying text.
Courts look for a first amendment right of access even after establishing a
common law right because the common law right of access is not "of constitu-
tional dimension." United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1582 (9th Cir. 1988)
(citing Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1293
(9th Cir. 1986)). The party seeking to deny a first amendment right of access
first must demonstrate a compelling interest in denial, and, further, that de-
nial is "narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). In contrast, the decision whether to seal
documents protected by a common law right of access "is one best left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." Warner Communica-
tions, 435 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted).
22. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. Chief Justice Burger began
with a reminder that "'the First Amendment does not speak equivocally ....
It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language,
read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.'" 1d. at 576 (quoting
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (footnote omitted)). Thus, the
right of access to criminal trials is guaranteed by the "amalgam of the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press" as well as the right of assembly.
Id. at 577.
23. Id.
24. Id, at 581 n.18.
25. Id. (stating that "[we have no occasion here to define the circum-
stances in which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public").
The Court further stated that "[j]ust as a government may impose reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interest
of such objectives as the free flow of traffic, ... so may a trial judge.., impose
reasonable limitations on access to a trial." Id. (citation omitted).
26. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
1990]
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trial.27 To close a criminal trial to the public, the trial court
must find a compelling government interest in exclusion, and
further find that exclusion is the best means of achieving that
interest.28
Although Richmond Newspapers recognized a first amend-
ment right to attend criminal trials,2 9 and Globe Newspaper es-
tablished a standard for determining the limits of that right,30
federal courts still lacked a test for identifying other proceed-
ings to which a first amendment right of access attaches. De-
spite this gap in the law, the Ninth and Third Circuits extended
the first amendment right of access to pre-trial suppression
hearings,31 and the Supreme Court added jury selection to the
list of protected proceedings. 32
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise
II),33 the Supreme Court found a qualified first amendment
right of access to preliminary hearings as conducted in Califor-
nia.34 Recognizing the need for a consistent means of determin-
27. Id. at 606-07.
28. Id The Court recognized that the right of access to trials is not abso-
lute, but found that "the State's justification in denying access must be a
weighty one." Id at 606. This approach is more protective of the first amend-
ment than the "reasonable limitations" standard that Chief Justice Burger ar-
ticulated in Richmond Newspapers. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581
n.18; see supra note 25. The burden is on the government to show that exclu-
sion is "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
29. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1982)
(extending the first amendment right of access to suppression hearings and
other pre-trial proceedings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir.
1982) (Criden 11) (holding that societal interests prohibit the closure of sup-
pression hearings). Citing the Supreme Court's view that "the first amend-
ment is to be interpreted in light of current values and conditions," the Third
Circuit skipped the Richmond Newspapers historical analysis. Id. at 555 (cita-
tion omitted). The court noted that suppression hearings, unlike trials, were
adopted too recently to have a history of openness. Id.
32. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press-
Enterprise I). Although the Court did not articulate a test for determining
whether a court may close a particular judicial proceeding, it echoed the rea-
soning of Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper. The Court first deter-
mined that historically, voir dire "has presumptively been a public process."
Id. at 505. As in Globe Newspaper, the Court held that a party can overcome
the presumption of openness only if "closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 510; see also
Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1167 (extending the first amendment right of access to
voir dire and other pre-trial proceedings).
33. 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II).
34. Id. at 13. The Court carefully worded its decision so that its holding
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big whether a class of criminal proceedings should be open to
the public and press, the Court established a two-part test of
"experience and logic."3 5 To apply the Press-Enterprise If test,
a court first considers whether previous courts' experience with
the judicial process in question has led to a tradition of open-
ness surrounding that process.3 6 A court then questions
whether, logically, public access would improve the effective-
ness of the process.37 Finally, the Supreme Court held that
even if a first amendment right of access attaches to a class of
proceedings under the "experience and logic" test, a court still
may close a particular proceeding in that class if the govern-
ment shows a compelling reason for closure under the Globe
applies only to hearings as conducted in California. d. (citing CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 858-883 (West 1985)); see also id at 10-15 (discussing the tradition of
accessibility to preliminary hearings as conducted in California and the value
of public access to such hearings). The Court noted that, unlike most other
states, preliminary hearings in California are quite extensive and are "often
the final and most important step in the criminal proceeding." Id. at 12.
35. 1d. at 8-9. To create the test, the Court synthesized its previous deci-
sions on the first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. See id. at
8. In fact, Justice Brennan first suggested the "experience and logic" test in
his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring). The Globe Newspaper majority also recognized the
tradition of open trials and their important role in the criminal justice system.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982). It was not
until Press-Enterprise I, however, that the Court created a test lower courts
can apply in determining whether there is a first amendment right to attend a
particular class of criminal proceedings.
36. 478 U.S. at 8. The court must examine "whether the place and process
have historically been open to the press and general public." Id. The Court
drew the "experience" prong of the test directly from Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 564-73 (plurality opinion), in which the Court had reviewed Eng-
land's early history of open trials. 478 U.S. at 8. Unable, however, to trace the
history of preliminary hearings to tenth-century England, the Court settled
for a 180 year tradition of openness. Id. at 10 (noting that in the celebrated
1807 trial of Aaron Burr for treason, the probable cause hearing was widely
attended by curious citizens). This represented a significant weakening of the
Richmond requirement of a history of openness. See Note, The Supreme
Court's Development of the First Amendment Right of Access to Criminal Pro-
ceedings and the Ninth Circuit's Expansion of that Right, 25 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 379, 403-04 (1989) (noting that "[i]nstead of looking to English common
law... the Court provided access to California preliminary hearings because
preliminary hearings were open historically in a majority of state courts").
37. 478 U.S. at 8-9. In the words of Chief Justice Burger, the "logic"
prong is satisfied if "public access plays a significant positive role in the func-
tioning of the particular process in question." Id, at 8. Although virtually
every aspect of the criminal justice system benefits from public scrutiny, some
proceedings, such as grand jury investigations, can function effectively only be-
hind closed doors. Id. at 8-9; see infra note 63.
1990]
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Newspaper strict scrutiny test.38
Press-Enterprise II, then, adopts a two-tier test for deter-
mining whether a particular judicial proceeding must be open
to the public. The first tier contains the "experience" and
"logic" prongs, and asks whether a first amendment right of ac-
cess attaches to the class of proceedings to which the particular
proceeding belongs. If the court finds that access to a given
class is protected by the first amendment, it moves on to the
second tier of the test, in which the particular proceeding at is-
sue is considered. At this stage, the presumption of openness
can be overcome only by a compelling government interest.
Applying the Press-Enterprise II test, the Fourth Circuit
has found a constitutional right of access to plea hearings 39 and
sentencing hearings.40 The Ninth Circuit, in Seattle Times v.
United States District Court,41 found a first amendment right to
attend pre-trial detention proceedings, despite having some dif-
ficulty satisfying the "experience" prong.4 2 Although such
hearings often are open, bail is commonly set by a judge or
magistrate in closed court.4 3 Because of the increasing impor-
38. 478 U.S. at 9-10. If a class of proceedings has passed the Press-Enter-
prise H "logic and experience" test, but the government wishes to close a par-
ticular proceeding of that type, it must demonstrate that closure in that
instance is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
39. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986). The
Fourth Circuit first suggested that it did not need to apply the Press-Enter-
prise H test because a plea hearing is, for all intents and purposes, part of the
trial, and therefore covered by the Supreme Court's Richmond Newspapers de-
cision. Id. (stating that "[b]ecause the taking of a guilty plea serves as a substi-
tute for a trial, it may reasonably be treated in the same manner as a trial for
First Amendment purposes"). In the alternative, the court held that plea
hearings satisfy both prongs of the Press-Enterprise II test. Id. Although they
do not have a long tradition, plea hearings typically are open to the public. Id.
Additionally, "[tihe presence of the public operates to check any temptation
that might be felt by [either] the prosecutor or the court to obtain a guilty plea
by either coercion or trick." Id.
40. Id. As with plea hearings, see supra note 39, the Fourth Circuit first
asserted that sentencing hearings fall under the first amendment right of ac-
cess to trials found in Richmond Newspapers. Washington Post, 807 F.2d at
389. The court found it easier to apply the Press-Enterprise II test to sentenc-
ing hearings than plea hearings because "[s]entencings have historically been
open to the public." Id. Public scrutiny also helps to deter an "arbitrary or
disproportionate sentence." Id.
41. 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 1517. The Seattle Times court also found a right of access to doc-
uments associated with these proceedings. Id.
43. Id. at 1516. Bail usually is set "by the judge when an indictment is
returned [in a closed grand jury hearing] or by the magistrate when an arrest
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tance of detention hearings in the criminal judicial process,44
however, the court overlooked the absence of a history of
openness.45
B. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Although the two-part Press-Enterprise II test is now the
accepted standard for determining whether a first amendment
right of access applies to a class of judicial proceedings,46 the
state of the law regarding access to judicial documents is not as
well established. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,47 de-
cided in 1978, is the only Supreme Court case to consider the
right of access to judicial documents rather than proceedings.
In Warner Communications, the Court considered whether the
public had a right of access to tape recordings that the prosecu-
tion had obtained from President Nixon for use as evidence in
the criminal trial of several of his former advisors.48 The Court
found a general common law right to inspect and copy judicial
records and documents based on longstanding practice in
American courts.49 Because the information contained in the
documents already had been released, the Court found no first
amendment issue concerning the right of physical access to the
documents in question. 50
Unlike the first amendment right of access to judicial pro-
warrant issues [in a closed, ex parte proceeding]."' Id (quoting United States
v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983)).
44. Id "Under these circumstances," the court asserted, "the historical
tradition surrounding bail proceedings is much less significant." Id
45. Id. at 1517. The court also found that bail hearings satisfy the "logic"
prong of the Press-Enterprise II test. .d at 1516. Access to bail hearings, the
court determined, increases the public's awareness of the criminal justice pro-
cess. Id In addition, the court determined that, as with most other criminal
proceedings, public scrutiny "will help to ensure this important decision is
properly reached and enhance public confidence in the process and result." Id.
at 1517 (citing Press-Enterprise v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1983) (Press
Enterprise I)).
46. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
47. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
48. Id at 597-98.
49. I& The Court held that although the public had a common law right
of access to the tapes, those tapes that were private in nature could remain
sealed under provisions of the Presidential Recordings Act. Id. at 603 (stating
that only those tapes "of historical value may be preserved and, eventually,
made accessible to the public").
50. Id. at 609. The trial court already had released transcripts of the tapes
to the press and public. Id Thus, according to the Court, there was no first
amendment issue because "[tihere simply were no restrictions upon press ac-
cess to, or publication of any information in the public domain." Id
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ceedings, which can be overcome only when the government
advances a compelling reason for closure that satisfies the strict
scrutiny test,51 the Warner Communications Court explained
that the question of whether a particular document may remain
sealed without violating the common law right of access is best
left to "the sound discretion of the trial court."52 The borders
of the common law right of access to documents, according to
the Court, are not clearly delineated, nor is it clear what factors
the trial court should weigh in deciding whether to release a
specific document.53
The Warner Communications decision left the federal cir-
cuit courts a great deal of room to create varying interpreta-
tions of the common law right of access to judicial documents.54
Courts have disagreed about how much discretion to allow the
district court judge in deciding whether to grant access.55 The
Second, Third, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits all
recognize a strong presumption in favor of access to judicial
documents.56 The Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, in con-
trast, give more deference to the determination of the trial
judge.57
Since Warner Communications, courts have found a com-
mon law right of access to documents introduced before, dur-
ing, and after the trial, including video and audio tapes
51. Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (holding that proceedings cannot
be closed unless closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest); see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
52. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 599.
53. Id at 598-99. The Court found no need "to delineate precisely the con-
tours of the common-law right." Id. at 599.
54. Id at 598-99.
55. For example, the Eighth Circuit explicitly "decline[d] to adopt the rea-
soning of the Second, Third, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, which
recognize a 'strong presumption' in favor of the common law right of access."
United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
right of access did not embrace the copying of audio tapes in a mail fraud
case). The court instead followed the Fifth Circuit, giving the district court
judge more discretion. Id.; see Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423,
430-31 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying an "abuse of discretion" standard to deny
access).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that broadcast networks presumptively are entitled to copy and tele-
vise videotapes entered in evidence); In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d
609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d
Cir. 1981) (Criden I) (same); In re Application of National Broadcasting Co.
(United States v. Myers), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980) (same).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1576-77 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying "abuse of discretion" standard); Webbe, 791 F.2d at 106 (same);
Belo Broadcasting Corp., 654 F.2d at 430-31 (same).
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admitted into evidence,58 motions and supporting affidavits,5 9
transcripts of tape recordings given to the jury,60 bills of partic-
ulars,6 ' and presentence investigation reports.62 The Ninth Cir-
cuit even found a common law right of access to grand jury
records, "tempered by the long-standing rule of secrecy of the
grand jury."63
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit strengthened the right of access
to judicial documents by finding a first amendment right of ac-
cess to pretrial documents in general.64 The court found an his-
58. Criden I, 648 F.2d at 823.
59. CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985).
60. United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1984).
61. United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985).
62. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 237 (7th Cir. 1989).
63. In re Special Grand Jury (For Anchorage, Alaska), 674 F.2d 778, 780-
81 (9th Cir. 1982). Grand jury proceedings and related documents historically
have been protected by very strict secrecy. See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979) (noting that "[s]ince the 17th cen-
tury, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public, and records of
such proceedings have been kept from the public eye" (citing Calkins, Grand
Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 457 (1965))). The longstanding tradition of
grand jury secrecy is codified in great detail in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(e).
The Third Circuit offered the following justifications for grand jury se-
crecy in United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954):
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contem-
plated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delib-
erations, and to prevent persons subject to the indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation
of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before
grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have in-
formation with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect in-
nocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he
has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial
where there was no probability of guilt.
The Supreme Court first adopted this list in United States v. Proctor & Gam-
ble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958), and more recently in Douglas Oil, 441 U.S.
at 219 n.10.
64. Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1983). The trial court had issued, sua sponte, an order that all documents
in the narcotics trial of automaker John DeLorean be filed under seal. Id at
1144-45. The judge presumably was concerned that intensive pre-trial public-
ity about the case would make it difficult to find an impartial jury. See id. at
1146-47. Although Associated Press preceded Press-Enterprise I, the Ninth
Circuit accurately predicted the two pronged "experience and logic" test. The
court recognized "experience and logic" from Globe Newspaper as the "two
principal justifications for the first amendment right of access to criminal pro-
ceedings." Id. at 1145. The Third Circuit also presaged Press-Enterprise II, de-
termining that "the institutional value of public indictments 'is recognized in
both logic and experience.'" United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (3d
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torical right of access to judicial documents,65 which the
Supreme Court had recognized earlier in Warner Communica-
tions.66 The Ninth Circuit also noted that pretrial documents
often deal with issues of public interest, such as allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct.67 Therefore, the court found that
pretrial documents may be essential in providing the public
with a full understanding of the criminal judicial process.68
After Press-Enterprise H was decided in 1986,69 other fed-
eral courts extended the "experience and logic" test from judi-
cial proceedings to related judicial documents. Courts found a
first amendment right of access to documents related to plea
hearings,70 sentencing hearings,7 1 pre-trial detention hearings,7 2
and pre-trial suppression hearings.73
C. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS
Since the Supreme Court first recognized both a common
law and a constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings
in Richmond Newspapers,74 and a common law right of access
to related documents in Warner Communications,75 federal
courts have extended either a common law or a constitutional
right of access to virtually every part of the post-indictment
criminal process.76 In three recent cases, two arising from the
"Ill-Wind" investigation, courts have been asked to find a right
of access to affidavits filed in support of search warrants in a
pre-indictment investigation.77 In contrast to the relative har-
Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (finding a first amendment right of access to bills
of particulars), cert denied, 480 U.S. 93 (1987).
65. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
66. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); see
supra text accompanying note 49.
67. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
68. Id.
69. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enter-
prise I1).
70. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389-90 (4th Cir. 1986). But cf.
United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 237 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is
no first amendment right of access to presentence reports).
71. Washington Post, 807 F.2d at 389-90.
72. Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th
Cir. 1988).
73. In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987).
74. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 554, 573, 580 (1980) (plu-
rality opinion); see supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
75. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597-98; see supra notes 47-53 and
accompanying text.
76. See supra Parts I. A.-B.
77. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210 (1989); In re Search
[Vol. 74:661
FIRST AMENDMENT
mony that has characterized previous decisions on access, the
circuits have disagreed widely on the existence of a right of ac-
cess to search warrant affidavits. 78
In the only federal case to consider this question before the
"Ill-Wind" cases, In re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bed-
room,79 the federal district court in Rhode Island found a com-
mon law 0 right of access to search warrant affidavits based on
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).8 ' The court noted
that search warrant affidavits become public documents once
they are filed with the clerk of the district court, as Rule 41(g)
requires.8 2 Therefore, the court found that affidavits are sub-
ject to the common law presumption of openness that applies to
all public and judicial records.83
A St. Louis newspaper, challenging the sealing of affidavits
supporting search warrants for offices at the McDonnell Doug-
las Corporation, precipitated the first "Ill-Wind" circuit court
Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 793 (1989);
In re Search Warrants Issued on June 11, 1988 for the Premises of Three
Buildings at Unisys, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1989); see supra notes 1-13
and accompanying text.
78. The Fourth Circuit found a common law right of access to search war-
rant affidavits, but no first amendment right. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886
F.2d 60, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1989). The Eighth Circuit found a first amendment
right of access. Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573. The Ninth Circuit failed to find either
a common law or first amendment right of access. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at
1218, 1220. See generally infra notes 84-107 and accompanying text (discussing
Times Mirror, Gunn, and Baltimore Sun).
79. 489 F. Supp. 207 (D.R.I. 1980).
80. The court did not consider the question of a first amendment right of
access.
81. Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. at 209. Rule 41(g) requires that
after execution, the search warrant and related documents be filed with the
clerk of court:
(g) Return of Papers to Clerk. The federal magistrate before whom
the warrant is returned shall attach to the warrant a copy of the re-
turn, inventory and all other papers in connection therewith and shall
file them with the clerk of the district court for the district in which
the property was seized.
FED. R. CRLM. P. 41(g).
82. Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. at 209. On its face, Rule 41(g)
clearly is intended to benefit the subject of the search because it provides the
subject with access to the documents necessary to challenge the validity of the
search warrant. FED. R. CRIa. P. 41(g). The court reasoned that Rule 41(g)
also is intended to benefit the public, "[s]ince important policies are served by
public disclosure of court records." Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. at 208
n.1.
83. Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. at 209 (citing Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)); see supra text accompanying
note 49.
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decision. The Eighth Circuit, in In re Search Warrant for Sec-
retarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,s4 found that the first amendment right of access
extends to search warrant affidavits.8 5 The court initially dis-
tinguished documents filed in support of search warrants from
the search warrant proceedings themselves, noting that the
press was only seeking access to the former.86 Applying the
"experience" prong of the Press-Enterprise II test,8 7 the court
noted that affidavits supporting search warrants are "routinely
filed with the clerk of court without seal."8 The court next as-
serted that public access to the affidavits satisfies the "logic"
prong of the Press-Enterprise II test8 9 because openness fosters
public understanding of the criminal justice system, and may
help prevent corruption among judges and prosecutors.90
Although the Gunn court held that a qualified first amend-
ment right of access to search warrant affidavits exists, it af-
firmed the trial court's decision to keep the affidavits from the
McDonnell Douglas search under seal.91 Applying the strict
scrutiny test first advanced by the Supreme Court in Globe
Newspaper,92 the Eighth Circuit determined that the govern-
84. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 793 (1989).
85. Id at 573.
86. Id. In dicta, the court stated that the process of issuing search war-
rants does not satisfy the requirements of the Press-Enterprise II test. Id
Search warrants, said the court, historically have been issued in a closed hear-
ing with a magistrate. IHi In addition, rather than having a "significant posi-
tive role in the functioning of the.., process," id, (citing Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (Press Enterprise II)), public access to
search warrant proceedings would likely frustrate the government's efforts to
execute the warrant. Id. at 574.
87. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
88. Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573.
89. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
90. Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573. "Moreover," the court determined, "even
though a search warrant is not part of the criminal trial itself, like voir dire, a
search warrant is certainly an integral part of a criminal prosecution. Search
warrants are at the center of pre-trial suppression hearings, and suppression
issues often determine the outcome of criminal prosecutions." Id, The court
reasoned that without an understanding of why search warrants are issued,
the public could not fully understand the criminal justice system. Id.
91. Id. at 575. Under the Press-Enterprise II test, once a first amendment
right of access to a type of document is established, a particular document may
be sealed only upon passing the strict scrutiny test established in Globe News-
paper. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. "'[D ]ocuments may be
sealed if "specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that 'closure
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to that inter-
est."' Gunn, 855 F.2d at 574 (citations omitted).
92. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); see
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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ment had met its substantial burden by showing that if the doc-
uments in this particular case were released, the government's
ongoing investigation would be "severely compromised."' 93
In another "Ill-Wind" case, Times Mirror Co. v. United
States,94 the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Eighth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Gunn.95 In applying the Press-Enterprise I
test, the court failed to distinguish between search warrant pro-
ceedings and supporting documents.96 The court found no tradi-
tion of public access to warrant proceedings,97 and went on to
state that the need for secrecy in an ongoing investigation out-
weighs any benefits derived from a right of access to search
warrant affidavits.98 Based on this reasoning, the court de-
clined to recognize a first amendment right of access to search
warrant affidavits.99
The Times Mirror court also found no common law right of
access to search warrant affidavits.1°° Although it noted the
93. Gunn, 855 F.2d at 574.
94. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989).
95. Id at 1217. Noting the basis for the Eighth Circuit's decision in Gunn,
the court stated that "[w]ith all due respect, we cannot agree with the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning." Id.; see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
96. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1214. In fact, the court never referred
to documents in its analysis, but considered instead whether the public has a
right of access to warrant proceedings. Id at 1213-17. In comparing its own
analysis to the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Gunn, the court noted that Gunn
makes a distinction between warrant proceedings and related documents, but
states that "[t]he warrant process... would be equally threatened if the infor-
mation disclosed during the proceeding were open to public scrutiny." Id. at
1217 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 1214-15. According to the court, the Eighth Circuit's contention
in Gunn that search warrant affidavits are routinely filed without seal is
merely descriptive of the common practice, and does not establish a constitu-
tional requirement of access. Id. at 1218.
98. Id. at 1215-16. Here again, the court declined to distinguish between
search warrant proceedings and supporting documents. Id. The court ac-
knowledged that access to search warrant proceedings and materials would
hinder prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, enhance the "'quality... of the
fact-finding process,'" and help to satisfy the community's urge for retribu-
tion. I&. (citation omitted). The court, however, likened search warrant pro-
ceedings to grand jury proceedings, which "'would be totally frustrated if
conducted openly.'" Id. (citation omitted); see supra note 63.
99. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1221.
100. Id, at 1219-20. The Ninth Circuit also examined briefly the question of
whether a right of access to search warrant materials derives directly from
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). Id at 1220-21. The court could not
find any evidence in the language of the rule or the advisory committee notes
indicating congressional intent to create a right of access to the affidavits. Id.
The court was unable to interpret the text of Rule 41(g), see supra note 81, as
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Supreme Court's holding in Warner Communications,0 1 the
court held that no common law right of access attaches to docu-
ments that historically have been kept secret "for important
policy reasons" unless the court finds compelling evidence that
disclosure is warranted.1 0 2
In the most recent federal case on the issue of public access
to search warrant affidavits, Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 0 3 the
Fourth Circuit came to a different conclusion than either the
Eighth or Ninth Circuit. Although it agreed with the Ninth
Circuit that there is no first amendment right of access to
search warrant affidavits,10 4 the Fourth Circuit, in reasoning
similar to that of the district court in Second Floor Bedroom, 0 5
found a common law right of access to the documents. 0 6 The
anything other than a "bare filing requirement." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at
1220. The court reasoned:
Had the [Advisory] Committee intended Rule 41(g) to expand the
public's right of access beyond that already secured by the First
Amendment or the common law, we would expect the legislative his-
tory of the rule to include some discussion of the need for public ac-
cess. The Advisory Committee notes, however, contain only passing
reference to Rule 41(g).
Id. at 1220-21.
The Ninth Circuit's approach contrasts with that of the district court in In
re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. 207 (D.R.I. 1980).
In that case, the court found an indirect link between Rule 41(g) and a com-
mon law right of access. Id. at 208-09; see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying
text.
101. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); see
text accompanying supra note 49.
102. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219-20. The court recalled that in United
States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1581 (9th Cir. 1988), it had "found a common
law right of access despite the fact that presentence reports traditionally had
been kept confidential by courts only because the party seeking access was
able to make a 'threshold showing that disclosure would serve the ends of jus-
tice."' Id. (citations omitted). Interestingly, the Times Mirror court never
found that search warrant affidavits historically have been kept secret. See
supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. It merely stated the general rule,
and held that in Times Mirror, the "ends of justice" standard had not been
met. 873 F.2d at 1220.
103. 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
104. Id. at 64-65. The court followed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Times
Mirror and held that search warrant affidavits fail the "experience" prong of
the Press-Enterprise II test because there is no history of openness surround-
ing the process of issuing search warrants. Id; see supra note 97 and accom-
panying text. Therefore, the court did not reach the question of "logic." Like
the Ninth Circuit, the Baltimore Sun court applied the Press-Enterprise II test
to search warrant proceedings, rather than related documents. 886 F.2d at 64;
see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
105. Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. at 208-09; see supra notes 79-83
and accompanying text.
106. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65 (citing Nixon v. Warner Communica-
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court held that search warrant materials may remain sealed
only if the court finds the requirements of the Globe Newspa-
per strict scrutiny test satisfied. 0 7
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt with public ac-
cess to judicial proceedings since Press-Enterprise 1,1L08 the
Court's "considerations of experience and logic" have become
the generally accepted means of determining when the first
amendment protects the public's right of access to a class of
proceeding or document. The weaknesses of the Press-Enter-
prise II approach, however, are evidenced by the varying re-
sults that the Eighth, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits have reached
when applying the "experience and logic" test to search war-
rant affidavits. 0 9 The search warrant cases demonstrate the
need for an updated, clearly defined right of access standard.
II. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE II
TEST
A. THE "EXPERIENCE" PRONG: THE NEED FOR A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS AND
RELATED DOCUMENTS
When applying the "experience" prong of the Press-Enter-
prise II test to search warrant affidavits, courts must distin-
tions, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978)). The court reasoned that because Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) requires the government to file search
warrant affidavits with the clerk of court, the affidavits become judicial
records. Id The Supreme Court recognized a general common law right of ac-
cess to judicial records in Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597-98; see
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
107. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65-66 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press Enterprise I) and In re Washington
Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986)). Sealing the document must be "es-
sential to preserve higher values and ... narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est." Ida (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510). Although the Fourth
Circuit found no first amendment right of access to the documents, it signifi-
cantly strengthened the common law right of access by adopting a strict scru-
tiny test. In fact, there is no practical difference between the Fourth Circuit's
common law right of access and the Eighth Circuit's first amendment right.
See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn,
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S.
Ct. 793 (1989).
The Fourth Circuit would have remanded Baltimore Sun to the trial court
for a determination of whether the documents met the strict scrutiny test.
The documents in question, however, already had been unsealed at the time of
appeal, so no remand was necessary. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 66.
108. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press Enterprise
II); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 73-107 and accompanying text.
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guish between the documents themselves, and the process of
which those documents are a part. The Ninth and Fourth Cir-
cuits, in Times Mirror and Baltimore Sun, failed to make this
crucial distinction.110 By applying the "experience" test to the
search warrant process rather than to supporting affidavits, the
courts were able to restrict public access to the affidavits with-
out actually considering whether access to those documents is
constitutionally protected.11' This flawed analysis may result
in incorrect results because some processes do not carry the
same tradition of access as their related documents. Search
warrants are a perfect example of this phenomenon; tradition-
ally, a judge or magistrate issues warrants in closed, ex parte
sessions.112 Conversely, search warrant affidavits are com-
monly accessible to the public once filed with the clerk of court
in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(g). 113
The language of the "experience and logic" test facilitated
the Ninth and Fourth Circuits' error. Because the Supreme
Court has never applied the test to documents,1 4 the language
of the test is suited only to examining whether a constitutional
right of access attaches to judicial proceedings.11 5 Under the
"experience" prong, courts must ask whether "the place and
process have historically been open to the press and general
110. See supra notes 96, 104 and accompanying text.
111. Few would argue that the process the government must undergo to
obtain search warrants should be an open one. The Supreme Court's test of
"experience and logic" demonstrates why there is no right of access to the pro-
cess. The proceedings fail the experience prong of the test, as search warrants
historically have been issued in an ex parte, in camera hearing before a magis-
trate. Nor would public involvement benefit the search warrant process. On
the contrary, logic dictates that it could do great harm to the criminal justice
system. If the press and public discover, prior to execution, that a judge or
magistrate has issued a search warrant, it is likely that the subject of the
search will find out as well, in time to destroy or move the evidence sought.
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978).
112. Id
113. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas
Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988), cert denied,
109 S. Ct. 793 (1989).
114. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), the only
Supreme Court case to consider whether there is a common law right of access
to judicial documents, was decided eight years before Press-Enterprise II.
115. This does not imply, and courts have not inferred, that the Supreme
Court would use a different test to consider whether a first amendment right
of access attaches to judicial documents. For examples of federal courts that
have applied the Press-Enterprise II test to judicial documents, see supra notes
70-73 and accompanying text.
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public.""16 Therefore, when considering whether a first amend-
ment right of access attaches to a class of documents, a court is
likely to apply the "experience" prong to the process from
which the documents arise, rather than to the documents
themselves. 117
When applying the Press-Enterprise II test to judicial docu-
ments, courts must modify the test appropriately. Courts
should ask whether the public traditionally has had access to
the documents in question, rather than whether the process to
which they relate historically has been open. In the federal
search warrant affidavit cases, only the Eighth Circuit properly
distinguished between documents and processes." 8
B. THE "LOGIC" PRONG: THE NEED FOR A TOUGHER
STANDARD
In addition to misinterpreting the "experience" prong of
the Press-Enterprise II test, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly ap-
plied the "logic" prong of the test in Times Mirror.119 In fact,
the Supreme Court's own interpretation of the "logic" prong
has made this part of the Press-Enterprise II test virtually
unnecessary.
Under the "logic" prong, courts must ask whether open-
ness plays a "significant positive role in the the actual function-
ing of the process" in question. 120 In Press-Enterprise II, the
Supreme Court found that public access to pre-trial hearings in
California benefits the process in three ways.' 12 First, institu-
tions in a democracy cannot function without the confidence of
the public, and such confidence is fostered by openness.122 Peo-
116. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (Press Enter-
prise I) (emphasis added).
117. See supra note 95.
118. See Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573. Acknowledging the government's argu-
ment that the search warrant process would be rendered ineffective by a find-
ing of a right of access, the Gunn court responded that "appellants do not seek
access to the process of issuing search warrants; they seek access to the affida-
vits and other materials submitted in support of the search warrant applica-
tions." Id.
119. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit de-
clined to reach the logic prong once it determined that search warrant affida-
vits fail the experience prong of the Press-Enterprise II test. Baltimore Sun
Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989).
120. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 11; see supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
121. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 11-13 (citing Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
122. Id at 12. The Court explained this theory more clearly in Richmond
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ple are naturally suspicious of something they cannot observe,
and suspicion undermines the public's confidence, lessening the
effectiveness of the process. 123 Second, public access safeguards
against abuse of power by government officials.12 4 Finally, the
Court suggested that secrecy would frustrate the "community
therapeutic value" of observing the functioning of the criminal
justice system. 25 The Court found these three positive effects
of access to pre-trial hearings as conducted in California suffi-
cient to meet the second prong of the test.126
The Supreme Court did not recognize, however, that the
same three benefits would result from a grant of public access
to every procedure or document in the criminal justice sys-
tem.' 27 Even the grand jury process, which courts frequently
suggest would be totally frustrated if conducted in public,2 8
would pass the "logic" prong under the openness factors set
forth in Press-Enterprise IL2 9 Public access to grand jury pro-
ceedings likely would increase the public's understanding, and
Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 572. The Richmond Newspapers Court quoted Profes-
sor Wigmore, who wrote that "[t]he educative effect of public attendance is a
material advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent
acquaintance acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confi-
dence in judicial remedies is secured which could never be inspired by a sys-
tem of secrecy." Id (quoting 6 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAw § 1834, at 438 (J. Chadbourn Rev. 1976)).
123. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12-13.
124. Id. This is especially true in pre-trial hearings, and, by extension,
search warrant proceedings, in which no jury is present to serve as "'an inesti-
mable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor, and against
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.'" Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
125. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13; see supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
126. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 11-13.
127. Although the Press-Enterprise II Court was only considering the ques-
tion of access to preliminary hearings as conducted in California, it used lan-
guage subject to a much broader application. As it did in Richmond
Newspapers, the Court discussed the benefits of an open justice system in gen-
eral, not just a specific segment of that system. Id at 11-13; see Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-73 (1980) (plurality opinion). In
Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989), the
Ninth Circuit noted that "[e]very judicial proceeding, indeed every governmen-
tal process, arguably benefits from public scrutiny to some degree, in that
openness leads to a better-informed citizenry and tends to deter government
officials from abusing the powers of government."
128. E.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218
(1979) (stating that "[w]e consistently have recognized that the proper func-
tioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings").
129. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 11-13.
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consequently the legitimacy, of the criminal justice system.
Openness would help ensure that the judge and prosecutor do
not mislead the grand jury to obtain an indictment. Finally, an
open grand jury hearing would engender the same therapeutic
value that results from being able to observe a pre-trial
hearing.130
The Ninth Circuit in Times Mirror did not actually deny
that access to search warrant affidavits would bring about these
significant benefits.1 3' Instead, the court determined that any
benefits of openness would be outweighed by severe draw-
backs.1 32 This is a legitimate concern, but not one that the
Press-Enterprise II test addresses. If the Supreme Court's test
is followed, even the Ninth Circuit admits that search warrant
affidavits would pass the "logic" prong.133 A new standard is
needed which integrates the reasoning of the Press-Enterprise
II test with the Times Mirror court's recognition that the dan-
ger to protected governmental interests will always outweigh
the benefits of public access to certain classes of judicial
processes or documents.
130. This is not to suggest that grand jury proceedings should be open to
the public. Rather, this analysis is offered to demonstrate that the public
would derive substantial benefits even from open grand jury proceedings, a
part of the criminal judicial process that virtually all courts agree must remain
closed. See supra note 126.
131. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215 (finding "clearly legitimate" interests).
132. 1&L The court stated:
Appellants marshal three arguments in support of their claim that
opening the warrant process would serve a significant positive role in
warrant proceedings.... While these interests are clearly legitimate,
we believe they are more than outweighed by the damage to the crim-
inal investigatory process that could result from open warrant
proceedings.
Even here, the court fails to distinguish between warrant proceedings and
related documents. The appellants did not, as the court claims, argue for an
opening of the warrant process. The appellants' only claim was that the war-
rants themselves and related documents "are unquestionably judicial records
to which the presumption of openness attaches." Brief of Appel-
lants/Petitioners at 18, Times Mirror (No. 88-6278).
133. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR A CLEARER "RIGHT OF
ACCESS" TEST AND APPLICATION OF THAT
TEST TO SEARCH WARRANT
AFFIDAVITS
A. THE "EXPERIENCE" PRONG
Because the Supreme Court is willing to find a first amend-
ment right of access when only a brief history of openness ex-
ists,L34 commentators differ on whether the "experience" prong
remains useful. Some authors argue that the "experience"
prong should be eliminated altogether,135 while others support
its continued use either as originally articulated in Richmond
Newspapers,136 or in its weakened Press-Enterprise II form.137
Assuming that the "experience" prong is retained, however, the
test must be stated more clearly than it was in Press-Enterprise
II, in which the Court asked only whether the "place and pro-
cess" traditionally have been open. 13 When considering a right
of access to a document, courts must ask whether the class of
document, rather than the procedure in which it is filed, has a
134. See supra note 36.
135. See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 1130-34 (arguing for elimination of the
"experience" prong). This Note attacks the experience prong on three fronts.
First, it points out the Supreme Court's failure to create a consistent standard
for determining how long a tradition of openness is necessary for a class of
proceeding to pass the experience prong. Id. at 1130-31. Second, it comments
that searching for a history of openness conflicts with the Supreme Court's
traditional approach of interpreting the first amendment "in light of current
values and conditions." Id. at 1131-32. Finally, the Note argues that there is
no logical link between the history factor and the first amendment ra-
tionale underlying the right of access. Right of access determinations
should be based on the relevance of the information involved to the
citizens' understanding of the functioning of their government. There
is no reason to believe that traditional openness is a useful proxy for
the information's capacity to promote self-governance.
Id at 1132 (footnotes omitted).
136. See, e.g., Note, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gan-
nett and Richmond Newspapers Public Right of Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 603, 618-20 (1986) (arguing for a return to Richmond's requirement of a
history of openness predating the Constitution). This Note argues that the ex-
perience prong should be strengthened because "the primary function of the
first amendment is to 'prohibit government from summarily closing [access to
places and sources of information] which had long been open to the public at
the time that amendment was adopted."' (quoting Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (plurality opinion))).
137. See, e.g., Note, supra note 36, at 404-05 (supporting a weakened experi-
ence prong, thus allowing courts to greatly expand on the first amendment
right of access to criminal proceedings).
138. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
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history of openness. 139
Search warrant affidavits easily pass the properly inter-
preted "experience" prong. As the Eighth Circuit noted in
Gunn, search warrants and related materials traditionally have
been open for public inspection.140 Government investigators
routinely file them with the clerk of court, as Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(g) requires.' 41 The documents are pre-
sumptively open, and the court seals search warrant affidavits
only on special request of the government. 142
B. THE BALANCING PRONG
The "logic" prong of the Press-Enterprise II test should be
replaced with a test that balances the benefits that access to a
class of documents would provide to the public14 3 against any
harms access would cause to legitimate government interests.'"
As explained above, the current "logic" prong serves no pur-
pose because every conceivable judicial process and related doc-
ument can satisfy its broad requirements. 145 When the
Supreme Court developed the Press-Enterprise II test, it cer-
tainly did not intend for the second prong to be so meaningless
139. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
140. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas
Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 793 (1989).
141. Id.; see supra note 81.
142. See Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573. In Second Floor Bedroom, the court noted
that "[t]hose few courts that have considered motions to seal or unseal affida-
vits have assumed that sealing was an extraordinary action." In re Search
Warrant for Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. 207, 209 (D.R.I. 1980).
143. By the time the analysis reaches this stage, there must be a presump-
tion of a first amendment right of access, because the proceeding or document
necessarily will have already satisfied all of the original requirements of the
Press-Enterprise II test. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
144. When the present "experience and logic" test is properly applied,
these are considerations the court will face when applying the strict scrutiny
test after a first amendment right of access has been established. The balanc-
ing test allows a court to establish a blanket denial of access to a class of pro-
ceedings or documents when damage to protected governmental interests will
always outweigh the benefits of access to any particular document or process
in the class.
Some federal courts used a balancing test before Press-Enterprise II, and
several state courts still use a balancing test in lieu of a two-pronged "experi-
ence and logic" test to determine access rights. See generally Note, supra note
17, at 1126-29, 1141 (discussing "right of access" decisions that have employed a
balancing test rather than an "experience and logic" test and advocating re-
placing the Press-Enterprise I test with deference to legislative decision-
making).
145. See supra Part II. B.
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that even grand jury hearings could satisfy its requirements. 46
Instead, the Court intended the "logic" prong to be a means for
courts to separate those judicial processes that benefit from
public scrutiny from those that would be undermined by a re-
quirement of openness. 147 If substituted for the "logic" prong, a
balancing test would accomplish what the Supreme Court
likely intended in Press-Enterprise II.
The Times Mirror court saw the inherent weakness of the
"logic" prong and used a balancing test instead.148 The court
recognized that public access to search warrant materials would
result in the same three benefits that the Supreme Court found
sufficient to propel California's pre-trial hearings past the
"logic" prong.149 It determined, however, that those benefits
are "more than outweighed" by the government's interest in
maintaining the integrity of an ongoing investigation. 150
Although the balancing test creates a stricter standard
than the ineffective "logic" prong, courts still should find that
search warrant affidavits pass the second prong of the test. The
public benefits from access to search warrant affidavits in the
same ways it benefits from open trials.1 1
The Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result under the bal-
ancing test, finding search warrant proceedings indistinguish-
able from grand jury proceedings.152 In its use of the balancing
test, however, as in its application of the "experience" prong,
the court failed to make a distinction between search warrant
proceedings and the documents related to the proceedings. 5 3
The court reasoned that open search warrant proceedings
would allow the subject of the search to learn of the proceed-
ings in time to move or destroy evidence.15 4 Recognizing a
right of access to search warrant affidavits would not involve
the same risk. By the time the press and public could gain ac-
146. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9. The Court noted that,
"[a]lthough many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny,
it takes little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of govern-
ment operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly. A clas-
sic example is [the grand jury system]." Id
147. See id. at 11-13.
148. See Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir.
1989).
149. Id; see supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
150. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
151. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
152. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
153. Id,; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
154. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1216.
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cess to the documents, the warrants would be executed and the
evidence seized. 55
The Ninth Circuit did raise several legitimate concerns
about allowing public access to search warrant affidavits. 56
For instance, other criminal suspects not yet the subject of a
search might be identified, allowing them time to alter the evi-
dence or even flee the jurisdiction. 157 These risks, however,
will be present only in some cases, while many more cases will
involve very few such risks. The court recognized this, but rea-
soned that a blanket rule against access would eliminate the
need for trial courts to decide whether to grant the public and
media access to search warrant materials on a case-by-casebasis.158
When balancing the advantages of public access against the
countervailing dangers, however, it is important to consider
only benefits and dangers inherent to the process or document
in question. The Ninth Circuit, in instituting a blanket restric-
tion on access, focused solely on isolated dangers of access and
gave inadequate weight to first amendment considerations.
Such analysis eliminates a burden on courts:s9 at the expense
of the public's first amendment right to information. Lessening
the workload of the federal courts is not an adequate justifica-
tion for a blanket denial of public access to documents that may
155. This Note does not argue that search warrant affidavits should be re-
leased to the public before execution of the warrants. Releasing the affidavits
before the search would jeopardize the government's investigation in the same
manner as open search warrant proceedings. See supra note 86 and accom-
panying text.
156. The court identified several justifications given by other courts for
grand jury secrecy, suggesting that they also apply to the search warrant pro-
cess. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215-16.
157. Id at 1215. In one of the few instances in which the Ninth Circuit ac-
tually considered the question of access to search warrant affidavits, rather
than the search warrant process, the court suggested that "if the proceeding
remained closed but the supporting affidavits were made public when the in-
vestigation was still ongoing, persons identified as being under suspicion of
criminal activity might destroy evidence, coordinate their stories before testi-
fying, or even flee the jurisdiction." Id
158. Id at 1217 n.8. According to the Ninth Circuit, its decision relieves
courts of the "burden of responding on a case-by-case basis to actions ...
brought during the middle of an ongoing investigation." Id Criticizing the
Eighth Circuit's approach to the "Ill-Wind" cases, the court noted that "the ap-
proach taken ... in [Gunn] requires the 'government to carry the burden of
demonstrating on the facts of each case a compelling need for secrecy." Id at
1217 n.7.
159. It also relieves federal prosecutors of the burden of demonstrating to
the court that the government has a compelling interest in sealing the docu-
ments. Id at 1217 n.8.
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not contain any information damaging to the government's in-
vestigation or the subject's privacy rights.160
C. THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
Under the Press-Enterprise II test, if the first amendment
protects the public's right of access to a class of proceedings or
documents, access may be denied to a particular proceeding or
document only on a showing that closure is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest.16 ' This strict scru-
tiny test, which the Supreme Court first adopted in Globe
Newspaper,162 applied on an ad hoc basis by a trial court, should
remain the final safeguard against release to the public of any
information that may damage the interests of the government
or the search subject.
Although the Ninth Circuit erred in allowing trial courts to
seal search warrant affidavits without cause, it is undisputed
that materials filed in support of search warrant applications
often may contain sensitive information. 16 3 The strict scrutiny
160. The Ninth Circuit suggests that courts should curtail a first amend-
ment right of access in order to relieve an administrative burden on them-
selves and government prosecutors. Id. The Supreme Court has indicated that
"administrative convenience" is not adequate justification for infringing on
first amendment rights. See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 218
(1986) (holding that "the possibility of future increases in the cost of adminis-
tering the election system is not a sufficient basis here for infringing appellees'
First Amendment rights"); cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973)
(holding that "administrative convenience" alone did not justify a law that ac-
corded differential treatment to male and female members of the military).
161. The strict scrutiny test, as articulated in Globe Newspaper and Press-
Enterprise II, only allows closure for compelling governmental interests. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text. The question of the accused's right to
privacy was not at issue in those cases because, as Professor Smolla notes, the
media is generally privileged to publish newsworthy information. R. SMOLLA,
LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10.04[2][b] (1988). According to Smolla, "[t]he concept
of newsworthiness [includes] ... many sorts of crimes [and] arrests." Id. at
§ 10.04[2][b][ii].
The right to privacy certainly is greater before indictment than after.
Publication of material in an affidavit could harm the reputation of the search
subject, even if the government decides not to charge the subject with a crime.
The federal district court in a Minnesota "Ill-Wind" case found that the pri-
vacy right of the search subjects warranted redaction of identifying informa-
tion in the affidavits before release of the documents. In re Search Warrants
Issued on June 11, 1988 for the Premises of Three Buildings at Unisys, Inc.,
710 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D. Minn. 1989). No other search warrant right of access
case has discussed the privacy issue, and no clear standard exists for sealing a
judicial document or closing a judicial proceeding to protect a privacy interest.
162. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982); see
supra notes 26-28.
163. Even the Eighth Circuit, which found a first amendment right of ac-
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test allows courts to prevent the release of sensitive documents
while ensuring that the public's first amendment rights are
given full consideration in each case. Furthermore, the strict
scrutiny test best protects the first amendment right of access
by permitting trial court discretion to release those parts of an
otherwise sensitive document that do not jeopardize a compel-
ling government interest.164
CONCLUSION
Recent cases considering whether a first amendment right
of access attaches to materials filed in support of search war-
rant applications expose weaknesses in the Supreme Court's
"experience and logic" test, first established in Press-Enterprise
II. The language of the test, which the Court developed to de-
termine whether a qualified first amendment right of openness
attaches to judicial proceedings, is too narrow to accommodate
cases that involve judicial documents rather than judicial
processes. With some modifications, however, the test will re-
main a fair method of deciding whether a particular aspect of
the criminal justice system must remain open to the public, in
accordance with the intent of the Press-Enterprise II Court.
Under the modified test, public access to search warrant mater-
ials would be protected by the first amendment.
When the Ninth and Fourth Circuits applied the "experi-
ence" prong of the Press-Enterprise II test to search warrant
materials, the result was illogical. Literally interpreted, the
"experience" prong required the courts to examine the history
of the search warrant proceeding to decide the existence of a
right of access to related documents. This prong of the test
should be updated to allow for more accurate investigations
into the tradition of openness or secrecy surrounding the docu-
ments themselves, rather than the process.
The requirements of the "logic" prong of the test can be
satisfied by any process or document, because openness would
benefit every aspect of the judicial system. In some cases, how-
ever, the need for secrecy outweighs such benefits. Thus, the
cess to search warrant affidavits, found much of the material in the Gunn affi-
davits too sensitive to release. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area
Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 574
(8th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 793 (1989).
164. As in Gunn, a court can carefully examine each contested document
to determine whether there is a compelling government interest in closure.
Gunn, 855 F.2d at 574. When practicable, the court may edit out sensitive ma-
terial. I&L
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"logic" prong should be replaced by a balancing test, which
would serve the purpose originally intended by the Supreme
Court: to weigh the benefits of allowing public access to a docu-
ment or process against the countervailing dangers to the gov-
ernment's law enforcement processes.
Under the modified two-tier test, the first amendment pro-
tects the public's and the media's right of access to search war-
rant materials. The second tier, the strict scrutiny test, allows a
court to consider whether adequate justification exists to deny
otherwise constitutionally protected public access to a particu-
lar search warrant-related document.
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